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Abstract
Boone et al. (Boone, C., De Brabander, B., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (1999a). Locus of control and
strategic behaviour in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Personality and Individual Diﬀerences, 27, 695–706;
Boone, C., De Brabander, B., & van Witteloostuijn, A. (1999b). The impact of personality on behaviour in
ﬁve Prisoner’s Dilemma games, Journal of Economic Psychology, 20, 343–377) showed that subjects with an
internal locus of control were, on average, more cooperative in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game than
subjects with an external locus of control. They conjectured that this ﬁnding should not be interpreted as
evidence for stable diﬀerences in cooperative behaviour between internals and externals. Speciﬁcally, they
suggested that it is the capacity to adapt to diﬀerent circumstances over time that distinguishes internals
from externals. In the present study we want to investigate the validity of this proposition. We argue that in
a PD setting individuals gradually learn to understand the subtle interplay between cooperation and self-
interest. Repetition and learning breed cooperation because people learn to understand that cooperation
is instrumental in obtaining long-run proﬁt. There is, however, good reason to believe that individuals
diﬀer as to the speed of learning to cooperate. We hypothesise that internals are more astute in
learning to cooperate in a PD game because they are more endowed with the cognitive faculties
necessary for quick learning than externals. Our empirical ﬁndings indeed reveal that externals play
less cooperatively, on average, in the ﬁrst part of a series of PD games. However, this diﬀerence gradually
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disappears. In fact, the experiment suggests that learning and repetition reduce the impact of individual
diﬀerences. By way of appraisal, implications for further research are discussed. # 2002 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Understanding the determinants of cooperative behaviour has been an important issue on the
agenda of many social scientists for several decades. This is witnessed by the huge body of early
experimental research in both economics and social psychology (Dawes, 1980; Pruitt & Kimmel,
1977; Rapoport, Guyer, & Gordon, 1976). In this research tradition, mixed-motive games, such
as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), have been extensively used to model competitive versus coop-
erative behaviour (Raiﬀa, 1982). The two-party version is the most widely used class of PD games
(Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). This setup will be used in the present
study, too. Technical details of the PD are discussed at length elsewhere (e.g. Rasmusen, 1990). It
suﬃces to mention here that the dilemma resides in the fact that the best possible outcome for all
parties as a group results when each party refrains from trying to maximise her or his self-interest.
However, no matter what the other party does, a player can always increase her or his payoﬀ in
the short run by defecting unilaterally. Thus, it is to each individual’s advantage to defect, at least
in the short run. Of course, when one of the parties defects, trust is undermined and cooperation
generally breaks down. The ﬁnal result is that when parties cannot resist the temptation to defect,
both parties end up being worse oﬀ. It is this continuous tension between the long-run gains of
cooperation versus the short-term incentives to compete which makes the game a realistic simu-
lation of real-world phenomena, and therefore interesting to study (Rasmusen, 1990).
Most experiments in the past have studied the impact of situational determinants on coopera-
tion. In this respect, an interesting stylised fact is that subjects, at least from Western societies,
tend to prefer the competitive strategy when playing one-shot PD games. However, when indivi-
duals play several games in a row against the same party, astute subjects quickly learn to coop-
erate and often enter into tacit collusion (Raiﬀa, 1982). This is the case irrespective of whether or
not the repeated games have a ﬁnite (known) or inﬁnite (unknown) horizon. Individuals gradu-
ally learn to develop long-term thinking in these games, because they recognise their mutual
dependency in obtaining a reasonable payoﬀ (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). So, repetition and learning
breed cooperation.
Whereas previous research almost exclusively focused on identifying the circumstances trigger-
ing cooperative behaviour, the question whether and why individuals diﬀer with respect to
cooperative behaviour received only scant attention. This is somewhat surprising as Kuhlmann
and Marshello (1975), already 25 years ago, demonstrated that individuals have diﬀerent ten-
dencies to compete or cooperate in mixed-motive games, where these tendencies, or orientations,
are relatively stable. Because we agree with Pruitt and Kimmel (1977), we followed their plea to
study the impact of individual attitudes and personality traits on cooperation in mixed-motive
games. Speciﬁcally, we started a series of experiments with the purpose of investigating the
behavioural implications of speciﬁc personality traits in a PD setting. We chose to focus on locus
of control in the current paper because it is a fundamental personality trait, which has been
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shown to have important ramiﬁcations for behaviour in a social dilemma setting (Boone, De
Brabander, & van Witteloostuijn, 1999a, 1999b). Before summarising the major ﬁndings of our
previous work, recall that the locus of control construct refers to individual diﬀerences in a gen-
eralised belief in internal versus external control of reinforcements (Rotter, 1966). Those who
believe in external control (i.e. externals) see themselves as relatively passive agents and believe
that the events in their lives are due to uncontrollable forces. Externals consider what they want
to achieve as dependent upon luck, chance and powerful persons or institutions. They think that
the probability of being able to control their lives by their own actions and eﬀorts is low. Con-
versely, those who believe in internal control (i.e. internals) see themselves as active agents, feel
that they are masters of their fates and trust in their capacity to inﬂuence their environment.
Internals believe that they control the events in their lives by their own eﬀort and skill.
In a previous experiment we found that, on average, internals played signiﬁcantly more co-
operatively than externals in a repeated PD game (Boone et al., 1999a, 1999b). The ﬁndings also
made clear that this diﬀerence was not the result of internals being more altruistic, but rather of
their tendency to use behaviour strategically in order to control their environment to obtain
valued outcomes. In other words, internals play more cooperatively, on average, in a PD because
it furthers their self-interest. In fact, they readily switch to a competitive strategy when this is
more appropriate to obtain a higher payoﬀ.
At a more general level, the results of the experiment made two things clear. First, it is essential
to study cooperative behaviour dynamically because individuals do not necessarily make an
either/or choice between cooperation and competition, as is often implied in a static analysis. As
a result, static analyses of cooperative behaviour largely miss the mark. Second, we also con-
cluded that the same comment can be made concerning the behavioural consequences of diﬀer-
ences in locus of control. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁndings underscored the suspicion that what
distinguishes internals from externals is not so much average and stable diﬀerences in behaviour,
but rather the capacity to adapt to diﬀerent circumstances over time. Again, searching for dif-
ferences at a speciﬁc point in time might be misleading. If we do not understand the overall pat-
tern and meaning of behaviour, analysing cross-sectional slices of that behaviour does not allow
us to draw unambiguous conclusions concerning the importance of individual diﬀerences.
In the present study we want to explore and combine the consequences of both of these insights
further. We argue that people from Western cultures, in which opportunism is deeply rooted
(Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1999), have to learn to cooperate in a PD game. They have to
understand that in the long run cooperation is in their self-interest. There is, however, good rea-
son to believe that individuals diﬀer as to the speed of learning to cooperate. It is here that locus
of control enters the picture. We hypothesise that internals are more astute in learning to co-
operate in a PD game. This proposition follows logically from the very deﬁnition of the concept.
Internals, who believe in their own potency to master their environment, are much more likely
than externals to use all their faculties to understand and inﬂuence their surrounding world as this
heightens the probability of successfully regulating behaviour (Boone, 1992; Lefcourt, 1982; van
Olﬀen, 1999). Internals will question their assumptions more and will be more attentive to cues
and feedback relevant to their decision making because they believe this may improve their per-
formance. To test the validity of these general behavioural consequences of the locus of control
construct, numerous experiments were conducted to relate locus of control with cognitive
activities like attention and alertness, and information search and assimilation. Reviewing this
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literature, Phares (1976, p. 78) concludes that internals ‘‘acquire more information, make more
attempts at acquiring it, are better at retaining it, are less satisﬁed with the amount of information
they possess, are better at utilising information and devising rules to process it and generally pay
more attention to relevant cues in the situation.’’ All this provides strong support for the validity
of the locus of control construct as it is indicative of a basic striving of internal individuals to
actively engage in the seeking for relevant cues in their environment to determine and make sense
out of their position and to guide or adapt their behaviour accordingly.
In the context of a PD game we expect that this eagerness of internals to learn how the world
works, makes them more alert and sensitive to the subtle interdependency of payoﬀs and the
long-run instrumentality of cooperation to obtain valued outcomes for one-self. However, we
think that externals will eventually catch up and change their strategy from competition to
cooperation, too. This is because (1) cooperation enhances self-interest and (2) it has been shown
that externals are not less intelligent than internals (Lefcourt, 1982). We assert that externals just
learn slower than internals because they are less endowed with the cognitive faculties that sustain
quick learning, as described earlier. To summarise, we expect that the ﬁnding of our previous
experiment—internals behave more cooperatively than externals, on average—will only show up
in the ﬁrst part of a series of PD games, but will subsequently disappear. In the long run, that is,
when everybody learned and internalised the rules of the game, individual diﬀerences with respect
to locus of control become irrelevant.
2. Method
2.1. Games
Because the experiment aims at extending insights from previous work, the games and
procedures we used in the present study are very similar to those in Boone et al. (1999a, 1999b).
The experiment was conducted during a 4-week course on statistical methods for second-year
students of management and organisation at the Dutch University of Groningen. The 4-week
course was part of a new curriculum, and only those students who had passed the ﬁrst-year
program were allowed to participate. At the onset of the experiment students ﬁlled out a
(computerised) questionnaire, revealing background and personality information. The actual
experiment consisted of two parts. In the ﬁrst week of the course 182 students played ﬁve
diﬀerent PD games in a row (Experiment I). To evaluate whether long-run learning actually
takes place, 92 of these 182 students volunteered to play the ﬁve PD games again 8 days later
(Experiment II).
It is important to stress that these 92 subjects were not a random sample of the 182 who started
the course and participated in Experiment I. Instead, they re-participated on a voluntary basis,
provided they had fulﬁlled some mild, formal criteria concerning attendance in the course. For-
tunately, analyses show that this group of students does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the ‘‘drop-
out’’ subjects with respect to locus of control, gender, age and average cooperative behaviour in
the ﬁve games of Experiment I, suggesting that attrition did not cause a problem of sample
selection bias in Experiment II. To be sure, however, that systematic sample diﬀerences do not
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account for our ﬁndings, we will not only analyse the data of Experiment I for the original sample
of 182 subjects, but also for the subset of 92 subjects that also participated in Experiment II.
Concerning the purpose of the experiment, we only announced that it was designed to deepen
their and our understanding of behaviour in a game-theoretic setting. The students were promised
feedback on the major ﬁndings of the research project after completion of the 4-week course. We
also guaranteed strict conﬁdentiality of the information provided by the questionnaires.
In both experiments, ﬁve PDs were presented to the subjects in a ﬁxed order, mainly for the
sake of simplicity and comparability of ﬁndings between the experiments. The order of pres-
entation and the main characteristics of the games are summarised in Table 1. We acknowledge
that choosing this ﬁxed-order design has also a drawback. Speciﬁcally, increases in the average
level of cooperation across the games within Experiments I and II, respectively, cannot be
unambiguously ascribed to learning, but could also be the result of the diﬀerent game conditions.
However, in this particular study, we think that the ﬁxed-order presentation is not problematic
for two reasons. First, because the games were presented in the same ﬁxed order in both Experi-
ments, our design eases comparison of ﬁndings between Experiments I and II. This is important
because we are interested in ﬁnding out whether ‘‘true’’ learning takes place over longer periods
of time. Note that any systematic diﬀerence in average cooperative behaviour between Experi-
ments I and II cannot be explained away by the ﬁxed-order presentation of the games. Second,
the focus of the present study is on detecting individual diﬀerences in the dynamics of cooperation
over time and across diﬀerent situations. The ﬁxed-order design in no way precludes drawing
conclusions as far as this research issue is concerned.
Each game consists of 12 rounds of choices, except for game III in both experiments. In fact,
game III has an unknown horizon, being ended at random after 13 rounds in Experiment I and
after nine rounds in Experiment II. In the ﬁrst two games, subjects played against a ﬁctitious
party, receiving no information on the choices made by that party in each round. Therefore, these
games are essentially ‘‘one-shot’’ or non-interactive games. In the last three games, dyads were
randomly formed, and the subjects played interactive repeated games. That is, choices were made
Table 1
Main characteristics of experimental games
Game Type of game Main characteristics of game
I ‘‘One-shot’’ 12 choices (low or high price) against ﬁctitious party
No information on past behaviour of other party
Baseline game
II ‘‘One-shot’’ 12 choices (low or high price) against ﬁctitious party
Information on past behaviour of other party
III Repeated Subjects make independent and simultaneous choices in each round
Exchange of choices made by both parties after each round
Unknown horizon (‘‘inﬁnite’’ game)
Final payoﬀ equals sum of payoﬀ in each round
IV Repeated Same as game III, except horizon which is ﬁnite and known (12 rounds)
V Repeated Same as game IV, except payoﬀ matrix which is changed to elicit cooperation
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simultaneously and independently in each round, after which subjects were informed of the
choice made by the other party. Game III has a so-called inﬁnite horizon as the subjects were not
informed about the game’s end round (i.e. game III was ended at random). The fourth game is
similar to game III except that we now announced in advance that the game would end in round
12. In the last game, we changed the values of the payoﬀ matrix used in all the other games such
that the incentive to cooperate might increase in the eyes of the players. The horizon of game V
was, again, ﬁnite and known to be 12 rounds. The instructions and payoﬀ matrices of the games
can be found in the Appendix. The games in both experiments are close copies. Only slight dif-
ferences in the payoﬀ structure (without aﬀecting the games’ formal Nash equilibrium outcomes)
were introduced so as to trigger the students’ alertness.
Note that the ﬁrst two non-interactive games can be considered as baseline measures of coop-
erative behaviour. Both measures give an impression of the subjects’ basic inclination to pursue a
competitive or cooperative strategy. The bulk of experimental research has revealed that compe-
titive strategies are preferred in such ‘‘one-shot’’- settings, at least in nations with an individua-
listic cultural tradition (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1999). The baseline strategy, however, also
depends on the players’ educational background: economics students, for instance, tend to com-
pete much more often than their colleagues studying other majors (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan,
1993). In the second game, we manipulated the reputation of the other (ﬁctitious) party by sug-
gesting that this party was trustworthy because (s)he had made cooperative choices in each of the
12 rounds in the previous encounter (i.e. cooperative feedback). We expect baseline cooperation
to drop because, as we argued elsewhere, opportunism is deeply rooted in Western societies.
Indeed, the individualistically oriented Dutch subjects in a previous experiment were inclined to
‘‘exploit’’ the ‘‘sucker’’ with a cooperative reputation by reducing the number of cooperative
choices almost to zero (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 1999). Subsequently, we expect cooperation
to gain importance gradually, on average, in the last three repeated games. As said before, when
players are engaged in repeated interaction with another party they quickly learn to cooperate,
and often enter into tacit collusion, irrespective of whether the game’s horizon is known or not
(Raiﬀa, 1982).
2.2. Experimental procedure
Experiments I and II took place in one large room. The procedure used in both experiments
was the same. In the room there were three groups; each group had three rows of pairs of tables.
The pairs of tables were separated by the space of one table. When entering the room, the stu-
dents were randomly distributed over the three groups and within the three groups over the
available seats. Pairs of subjects were formed to play the repeated PD games (i.e. the last three
games in Experiments I and II). These dyads consisted of students sitting side-by-side. Note that
the purpose of this 2-fold randomisation procedure was to avoid the occurrence of the same
random dyads in both experiments as much as possible. We deemed it important to have diﬀerent
dyads in both experiments in order to ﬁnd out whether learning takes place irrespective of the
partner with whom a subject is playing. It is, for instance, possible that a subject plays more
cooperatively in a second encounter when she knows her opponent from a previous encounter.
We trusted that simple randomisation concerning the second pairing would make the occurrence
of the same pairs rare. Therefore, we did not randomise with the constraint that no one would
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have the same partner as in Experiment I. Unfortunately, the randomisation procedure without
constraint resulted in the extremely unlikely outcome of 10 pairs of subjects in Experiment II who
also played against each other in Experiment I. To check whether this constitutes a problem for
the results reported below, we redid the analyses related to Experiment II without these 20 sub-
jects. These ﬁndings, however, are very similar compared with those pertaining to the 92 subjects.
Note also that the average level of cooperative behaviour in each of the ﬁve games of Experiment
II of the subjects who played twice against the same partner (n=20) does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
from the cooperative behaviour of the subjects who played against a new partner (n=72). To
summarise, both checks make clear that the relative ‘‘failure’’ with respect to making new random
pairs does not inﬂuence the outcomes and interpretations of the analyses reported below.
One experimenter and two assistants, identiﬁed by wearing similar shirts, guided each of the
three groups. The assistants handed out the various forms with information while the experi-
menter remained in front of the group during the entire experiment. All groups started the
experiment at the same clock time.
The PD was presented as an oligopoly pricing problem. The experimenter ﬁrst announced that
ﬁve games were to be played, and that detailed information about each game would be provided
just before the game involved started. Then, he showed and explained the general payoﬀ structure
of the ﬁrst game (see the Appendix). The subjects could make two choices: setting a low price
(corresponding with a competitive choice) or setting a high price (corresponding with a coopera-
tive choice). The instructional phase fully and redundantly explained the interdependent nature of
the payoﬀs, so that the consequences of diﬀerent combinations of choices were clearly understood
(see also Frank et al., 1993). Following Schlenker, Helm and Tedeschi, (1973), we avoided the use
of such terms as ‘‘compete’’, ‘‘cooperate’’, ‘‘defect’’ and ‘‘sucker’’ so as to insure a neutral
instructional set. Note that in the remainder of this paper we use diﬀerent terms ranging from less
to more neutral to denote ‘‘the other party’’ in the game. We stress, however, that we only used
neutral terms in addressing the participants during the experiments.
The experimenter, who gave instructions as to when and how to make choices in each game,
strictly controlled the pace of the experiment. The subjects received a booklet with the instruc-
tions of each game and a corresponding response sheet. The experimenter, using slides, clariﬁed
every instruction. As mentioned earlier, games I and II involved making 12 choices in a row
against a ﬁctitious party. At the onset of game III, the experimenter announced each subject’s
opponent/partner for the three repeated games. The subjects received a booklet with small blank
notes and were instructed in each round to make a choice independently and simultaneously.
Next, subjects had to write down their choice on such a blank note. After every subject had
written down her or his choice, the experimenter instructed the parties to exchange the notes
with their choice. Following this exchange, subjects marked their choice, the opponent’s choice
and their payoﬀ on a response sheet. This procedure was repeated for each round in the three
interactive games. Of course, apart from the exchange of notes no communication was
allowed.
Following standard experimental gaming, the subjects were instructed to maximise their payoﬀ
during the experiment (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Schlenker et al., 1973). Additionally, although
much experimental psychology has revealed that subjects take experiments very seriously
anyway, we introduced an extra motivational incentive by means of the announcement that
the top-ﬁve players in terms of the accumulated payoﬀ would receive a token for music
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records. We also appealed to the social motivation for prestige by telling the subjects that the
ranking of payoﬀs, including the players’ names, would be announced in public in a ﬁnal plenary
session at the end of the 4-week course, on a bulletin board and on the Faculty’s students’
internet homepages.
2.3. Subjects and measures
The study pertains to 182 students of management and organisation of the University of Gro-
ningen for Experiment I, and a subset of 92 of these subjects for Experiment II. The information
and descriptives reported in this section pertain to the sample of 182 students. The average age of
the subjects is 19.65 years (S.D.=1.04), and the majority of the participants were male (66%).
Their locus of control scores were measured with the well-known and widely used Rotter scale
(Rotter, 1966), translated into Dutch by the authors. The original scale contains 29 forced-choice
items, 23 of those items being designed to measure the locus of control expectancies (and six being
ﬁller items). Each item consists of a pair of statements. The respondents have to choose between
an ‘‘internal’’ and an ‘‘external’’ alternative. The following pair of statements is a clear example:
‘‘Many times I feel that I have little inﬂuence over the things that happen to me’’ (external alter-
native) and ‘‘It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my
life’’ (internal alternative). A total locus of control score is obtained by counting the number of
external alternatives chosen (with minimum zero and maximum 23). The number of ﬁller items in
the present study was increased to 14 in order to make the purpose of the test more obscure. The
reliability of our Dutch translation was demonstrated in several studies (Boone, 1992; Boone,
Gerits, & Willeme´, 1990; De Brabander, Boone, Gerits, 1992). Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach,
1951) amounts to 0.65 (n=182 with 23 items) in this sample, which concurs with the internal
consistencies reported by Robinson and Shaver (1973) and Rotter. The value of alpha calculated
for this sample is well above the lower limits of acceptability, generally considered to be in the
0.50–0.60 range (Nunnally, 1978). The average Rotter score of the present subjects equals 11.51
(S.D.=3.37), which is in line with averages reported for other samples of similar subjects (Boone
et al., 1999b).
Following other researchers (Cox et al., 1991; Uejio & Wrightsman, 1967), we measured coop-
erative behaviour by counting the total number of cooperative choices in each game. Recall that
in game III 13 and nine rounds were played in Experiments I and II, respectively. In order to
standardise measures over the ﬁve games, we multiplied the total number of cooperative choices
in game III with the ratio 12/13 in Experiment I and 12/9 in Experiment II.
In the analyses presented later we treat gender as a covariate because females appear to have a
more external perception of control than males [average score equals 11.10 for males (S.D.=3.41)
and 12.31 for females (S.D.=3.15); F-value=5.37 and P=0.022]. This is consistent with several
previous ﬁndings (McGinnies, Nordholm, Ward, & Bhanthumnavin, 1974; De Brabander and
Boone, 1990). A probable cause of this diﬀerence is suggested by McGinnies et al. (p. 454) by
indicating that ‘‘[t]here are, in all probability, few countries where women have achieved equality
of opportunity with males and where they possess freedom of self-determination to the same
extent as males. In any case, the present females probably were reporting a perception of their
status which was matched, at least for them, by social reality.’’ Descriptives of the variables under
study are presented in Table 2.
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3. Results
Before analysing the eﬀects of locus of control on cooperative behaviour, a few general remarks
with respect to the descriptives reported in Table 2 are worth making. First, the relatively high
average number of cooperative choices made in baseline game I (5.74 and 6.53 in Experiments I
and II, respectively) suggests that the present subjects have a more cooperative inclination than
the students in a previous experiment [compare with Boone et al. (1999b), where this average
equalled 2.0]. A possible reason for this diﬀerence may be that the subjects in the current sample
are management and organisation students, and not economics students as before. As already
mentioned above, Frank et al. (1993) showed that exposure to the self-interest model commonly
used in economics alters the extent to which people behave in self-interested ways. It is very likely
that management and organisation students are less exposed to this ‘‘hard core’’ economics
paradigm and more to ‘‘softer’’ business courses with a psychological and/or sociological ﬂavour
(e.g. organisational behaviour) than economics majors. This is immediately clear from a com-
parison of the curricula of both study programs, revealing a much smaller proportion of ‘‘hard’’
economics courses in the management and organisation curriculum. In this respect, we showed
elsewhere that even among economics students, the likelihood of cooperation increases with the
number of courses students have followed in which cooperation is emphasised (Boone & van
Witteloostuijn, 1999).
Note also that the number of cooperative choices drops in game II in Experiment I (from 5.74
to 4.50) and II (from 6.53 to 5.18), as expected. Paired t-tests show that this decrease in co-
operation is signiﬁcant (t=3.59 and P=0.000 in Experiment I, and t=2.85 and P=0.003 in
Experiment II). Apparently, opportunism is triggered when the other party has a cooperative
Table 2
Descriptives
Variablesa Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Locus of control 11.51 3.37 4 21
Age 19.65 1.04 18 26
Male (0)–Female (1) 0.34 0.22 0 1
Experiment I
Cooperation game I 5.74 3.61 0 12
Cooperation game II 4.50 4.09 0 12
Cooperation game III 4.91 3.14 0 12
Cooperation game IV 5.36 3.96 0 12
Cooperation game V 6.91 3.91 0 12
Experiment II
Cooperation game I 6.53 4.64 0 12
Cooperation game II 5.18 4.67 0 12
Cooperation game III 8.61 4.19 0 12
Cooperation game IV 8.39 4.17 0 12
Cooperation game V 8.13 4.17 0 12
a n=182 except for Experiment II, where n=92.
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reputation. Subsequently, the incidence of cooperation rises gradually in the last three repeated
games of Experiment I, again as expected (Table 2). Interestingly, in Experiment II cooperation
continues to rise in game III over and above the level of cooperation that could be observed in
game V in Experiment I. Thus, although there is an 8-day interval between both experiments, the
trend of increasing average cooperation revealed in Experiment I can simply be extrapolated to
Experiment II. This indicates that true learning takes place. Finally, we observe that, overall, this
general pattern of average cooperation in both experiments is very similar to the one found for
another sample of subjects (Boone et al., 1999b), providing conﬁdence in the reliability of the
data.
Because Rotter scores tend to be normally distributed [a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test shows that
the distribution of Rotter scores in the present sample does not signiﬁcantly deviate from a nor-
mal distribution either (z=1.05 and P=0.220)], it is likely that the implications of behavioural
diﬀerences associated with the locus of control will be most apparent at the extreme scores. For
the purpose of our repeated-measures ANOVA reported below, we therefore classiﬁed the sub-
jects in both experiments into three diﬀerent phenotypic groups based on the terciles of the locus-
of-control scores of the 182 subjects (instead of applying the usual two-group classiﬁcation based
on a median split): internals, those with an intermediate Rotter score (intermediates) and exter-
nals. This results in 55 internals, 71 intermediates and externals in Experiment I. These numbers
are 25, 38 and 29 in Experiment II, respectively. Fig. 1 presents the average number of coopera-
tive choices made in each of the ﬁve PD games in Experiment I by each locus-of-control group.
The results of Experiment II are shown in Fig. 2.
The data were analysed with repeated-measures ANOVAs with the number of cooperative
choices in each game as the dependent variable and one within-subject factor with ﬁve levels
(GAME). The between-subject factor is locus of control (LOC). Note that gender was entered in
the analyses as a covariate. In Experiment I, the factor GAME has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on average
cooperation (F=2.386, d.f.=4 and P=0.050). Thus, the trend towards more cooperation from
game II onwards is signiﬁcant. This pattern does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer over the three locus-of-
control groups. That is, GAMELOC is not signiﬁcant (F=0.756, d.f.=8 and P=0.756). The
between-subject eﬀect of LOC, however, is signiﬁcant (F=3.664, d.f.=2 and P=0.028). So, there
are overall diﬀerences between internals, intermediates and externals concerning the extent of
cooperative behaviour in Experiment I. Although GAMELOC is not signiﬁcant, Fig. 1 suggests
that the diﬀerences between the three locus-of-control groups can only be observed in games II,
III and IV. Separate ANOVAs per game indeed reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences in game III
(F=3.226 and P=0.042) and game IV (F=3.637 and P=0.028) caused by external subjects being
less cooperative than their internal and intermediate counterparts (post-hoc tests reveal that the
diﬀerences between internals and intermediates are small and not signiﬁcant). The overall
ANOVA for game II, however, is not signiﬁcant, although a post-hoc test indicates a marginally
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between externals and intermediates (mean diﬀerence=1.41 and P=0.055).
Note that the level of cooperation of internals and intermediates rises gradually from game II
onwards. This is not the case for externals. Externals only catch up with intermediates and
internals in the last game when their level of cooperation increases drastically compared with
game IV. As a result, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in game V anymore. Interestingly, in
game I, the diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant, suggesting that the observations mentioned above
cannot be ascribed to diﬀerences in the baseline inclination to cooperate. In order to check for the
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robustness of these results we also performed non-parametric Kruskall–Wallis tests to detect
diﬀerences between the locus-of-control groups. This test reveals a signiﬁcant between-subject
eﬀect of LOC on the average level of cooperation of the ﬁve games (Chi-square=6.894, d.f.=2
and P=0.032). Game-by-game analysis again shows that the diﬀerences between the locus-of-
control groups only materialise in game III and IV (Chi-square=7.001, d.f.=2 and P=0.030,
and Chi-square=6.668, d.f.=2 and P=0.036, respectively). These ﬁndings are exactly the same
as the parametric analyses reported above.
In Experiment II, none of the factors is signiﬁcantly related to the incidence of cooperative
behaviour, except for the factor GAME (F=10.558, d.f.=4 and P=0.000). Apparently, the
subjects average level of cooperation starts at the level where it ended in Experiment I and further
increases until it reaches its equilibrium at a high average value (around 8 out of 12; see Table 2).
As the subjects learned to cooperate, the eﬀect of individual diﬀerences with respect to locus of
control all vanished, as expected (this is also conﬁrmed by Kruskall–Wallis test results). That is,
from Experiment I to Experiment II, true learning has apparently taken place among all locus-of-
control groups.
Fig. 1. Locus-of-control and number of cooperative choices (Experiment I; n=182).
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Recall that Experiment II only pertains to a subset (i.e. 92 volunteers) of the 182 subjects that
participated in Experiment I. When comparing the results of both Experiments, it is therefore
important to rule out the possibility that the observed convergence in cooperative behaviour
among the locus-of-control groups is due to (possibly arbitrary) sample diﬀerences. For this
purpose we re-analysed the data of Experiment I only for those subjects who participated in
Experiment II as well. Fig. 3 shows the results of this exercise. The pattern of ﬁndings is almost
identical to that pertaining to the full sample (compare Figs. 1 and 3), although the between-
subject eﬀect of LOC is not signiﬁcant anymore (ANOVA test: F=1.913, d.f.=2 and P=0.154;
Kruskall–Wallis test: Chi-square=3.573, d.f.=2 and P=0.168). The reduced signiﬁcance is of
course due to the 50% drop in degrees of freedom. Taken together, as this sensitivity analysis
essentially yields the same qualitative results, the observed convergence between the locus-of-
control groups is unlikely to have been caused by subtle sample selection eﬀects.
Finally, it should be noted that one could argue that the existence of (slightly) diﬀerent condi-
tions in Experiment I vis-a`-vis Experiment II weakens the interpretation of shifts in cooperation
as ‘‘pure’’ learning eﬀects. Similarly, a point could be made that the evidence for externals
catching up with internals and intermediates would probably be stronger if the subjects had
played a number of identical procedures over time. The latter would enable one to observe
Fig. 2. Locus-of-control and number of cooperative choices (Experiment II; n=92).
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learning independently of diﬀerences in experimental conditions (these issues were already tou-
ched upon when explaining our ﬁxed-order design approach in Section 2). Notwithstanding these
qualiﬁcations, we think, however, that it is very reassuring that even in the one-shot games of
Experiment II all participants, irrespective of their locus of control, ‘‘pick up’’ cooperation at
exactly the same level they ended Experiment I. As both experiments are almost identical, we
think that this ﬁnding is clear evidence of all subjects learning to play cooperative over time. In
addition, presenting diﬀerent game conditions to subjects has also an advantage because it
broadens the range of observed behaviour. This makes sense when testing for individual diﬀer-
ences as it allows one to assess their general impact in a broad range of circumstances.
4. Appraisal
The aim of the present study was to investigate the dynamic relationship between locus of
control and cooperative behaviour. For this purpose, we conducted two experiments. In Experi-
ment I, where subjects do not yet have any experience in playing PDs, we found that external
subjects were signiﬁcantly less cooperative, on average, than internal and intermediate subjects.
However, this diﬀerence disappeared in the last game of Experiment I. Apparently, as expected,
Fig. 3. Locus-of-control and number of cooperative choices (Experiment I; n=92).
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externals tend to lag behind as far as learning to cooperate is concerned, only catching up with
the other groups after playing several PD games. The fact that we fail to observe signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between internals and intermediates came as a surprise. Perhaps, only relatively
‘‘extreme’’ externals suﬀer from symptoms of so-called learned helplessness (Lefcourt, 1982),
which make them less alert and sensitive to the subtle interdependencies so dominant in a PD
context. It should be stressed that these ﬁndings are probably to some extent sample speciﬁc. This
is because the three locus-of-control groups were not determined by general population norms
(which do not exist), but by using the observed locus-of-control scores of the subjects participat-
ing in the study. Although the mean locus-of-control score of the subjects in the present sample
lies at the midpoint of the scale (i.e. 11), a sample of university students is clearly not repre-
sentative of the ‘‘average’’ individual in society at large, but probably tends to lean toward the
more internal part of the population. It is therefore conceivable that in more representative samples
(i.e. more ‘‘external’’ samples compared with the present one) the slower learning to cooperate
starts closer to the average locus-of-control score of that sample, i.e. also for ‘‘intermediates’’.
We argued that the underlying reason for the observed diﬀerences between the locus-of-control
groups is related to diﬀerences in the capacity to learn. To be sure, only changes in actual beha-
viour rather than ‘‘true’’ learning can be observed. This is of course a major limitation of the
present but also of many other studies related to learning: learning is (and in many cases can)
only (be) inferred ex post. Similarly, the PD, although widely used to model competitive versus
cooperative behaviour, does not, in itself, allow one to understand unambiguously the true
motives or reasons of individuals to cooperate or to compete. It is a black box in which behaviour
can be driven by a plethora of, not necessarily mutually exclusive, reasons and motives. Coop-
eration can be the result of astuteness, insight and learning, but also of interpersonal trust, the
propensity to take risks, altruism, collective orientation, etc. In our view, motives such as collec-
tive orientation and altruism are unlikely candidates to explain the eﬀect of locus of control on
cooperative behaviour in Experiment I. There are two major reasons to believe that, indeed,
learning to cooperate is the underlying cause.
First, and most important, is the ﬁnding that no diﬀerences between the locus-of-control groups
could be observed anymore in Experiment II. In fact, cooperation was the rule rather than the
exception in Experiment II. Apparently, having experience in playing the PD game is suﬃcient to
make people cooperate, so rendering locus-of-control diﬀerences irrelevant. It is clear that if
stable motives, such as altruism, would have produced the results in Experiment I, then diﬀer-
ences in cooperative behaviour would not disappear overnight. As a result, the pattern of ﬁndings
is very consistent with individuals learning that cooperation is instrumental to further their self-
interest (i.e. to obtain a reasonable payoﬀ ).
Second, there is another reason why stable motives are unlikely candidates to explain the
observed eﬀect of locus-of-control on cooperative behaviour in Experiment I. If these motives
were the underlying reason to cooperate, we would expect to observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
baseline (non-interactive) game I—measuring the basic inclination of an individual to compete or
cooperate. However, we fail to do so.
Finally, a few general remarks are worth making. The present study clearly underscores the
value of the claim we made earlier. It shows that cross-sectional ﬁndings are at best misleading,
and that it is indeed essential to study personality and cooperation dynamically (Boone et al.,
1999a). It also sheds new light on the important—but frequently neglected—diﬀerence between
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strong and weak situations with respect to the impact of personality on behaviour (Weiss &
Adler, 1984). We agree with Weiss and Adler that personality research can beneﬁt a lot if
researchers would do more than just paying lip service to the distinction of weak versus strong
situations. The point is that personality can only serve as a guide in explaining behaviour when
the environment is uncertain and ambiguous (i.e. weak). However, when enough cues are pro-
vided as to the type of behaviour that is appropriate—either normative or instrumental —, then
individual diﬀerences are less important in understanding that behaviour. We conjecture that
experience and learning may make weak situations strong, and therefore reduce the impact of
personality. The present ﬁndings are consistent with this account, at least for the case of the
locus-of-control trait in a dynamic setting, as they suggest that experience indeed weakens the
impact of locus-of-control. Our study is only another small step into the study of the very com-
plex area of the impact and interplay of personality and experience. Given the promising ﬁndings,
however, we believe that this issue deserves more attention in future research. Speciﬁcally, repli-
cations and/or extensions using other situations and personality traits are essential in order to test
the generality of our ﬁndings and interpretations.
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Appendix
Game setting Experiment I
Two ﬁrms operate in the same market: ﬁrms I and II. Both ﬁrms can choose between two price
strategies: setting a low price and setting a high price. The proﬁts depend on the pairs of strategies
chosen. In the following payoﬀ matrix, the four possible proﬁt combinations (in thousands of
Dutch Guilders, Dﬂ.) are reported for Experiment I (Pi stands for the price strategy of ﬁrm i, with
i=I, II).
Firm II
Low price High price
Low price (30, 30) (600, 600)
Firm I
High price (600, 600) (300, 300)
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Each cell contains the possible proﬁt combinations (WI, WII). WI and WII are the (negative or
positive) proﬁts of ﬁrm I and ﬁrm II, respectively. The four proﬁt combinations are the following:
(1) PI low=PII low. Both ﬁrms choose to set the same low price. The proﬁt margins are nega-
tive. Both ﬁrms generate a loss of Dﬂ. 30,000.
(2) PI low < PII high. Firm I oﬀers a lower price than ﬁrm II. The customers of ﬁrm II prefer
to buy from the ‘cheaper’ ﬁrm I. The proﬁt of ﬁrm I is therefore Dﬂ. 600,000, and the loss of
ﬁrm II amounts to Dﬂ. 600,000.
(3)PI high > PII low. Firm II underprices ﬁrm I. The resulting proﬁt combination is the
opposite of the second case. Firm I generates a loss of Dﬂ. 600,000, and ﬁrm II a proﬁt of Dﬂ.
600,000.
(4) PI high=PII high. Both ﬁrms choose to set the same high price. The proﬁt margins are
positive. Both ﬁrms gain a proﬁt of Dﬂ. 300,000.
Game I
Suppose you are Chief Executive Oﬃcer of ﬁrm I. You decide autonomously on the price
strategy of your company. You have an appointment with your distributor to ﬁx the future price
strategy for your product. It is a custom in this industry that yearly contracts with distributors
are drawn, in which the price level you prefer to set in each month (or round) for the coming year
is stipulated in advance. It is impossible to change the terms of the contract afterwards. The Chief
Executive Oﬃcer of ﬁrm II will simultaneously determine her/his price strategy with her/his dis-
tributor (another than yours) for the following twelve months. You do not know the price
intentions of ﬁrm II (and vice versa). Indicate below for each round (month) which strategy you
prefer (L indicates low price; H indicates high price).
Game II
At the end of the contract, you found out that ﬁrm II has consistently chosen to set a high price
in each month of the previous contracting period. Subsequently, you have to draw a new contract
with your distributor for the next twelve months. Indicate again which price strategy you prefer
in each month.
Game III
Your information on the past intentions and price strategy of ﬁrm II became irrelevant. The
reason is that ﬁrm II has been taken over by another company, which installed a new Chief
Executive Oﬃcer. The government has also decided that contracts in which prices are set for
more than one month in advance are now illegal. Thus, for the next year you are only allowed to
ﬁx your price level for one month; after every month you have to decide again for the next round.
Decisions are made simultaneously in each month.
You play the game for an unknown number of months (rounds). You do not know in advance
how many times you will have to make a decision on your price strategy. The game can end any
moment after round 8. The probability that the game ends after round 8 equals 20 per cent. The
sequence of decisions/activities you have to perform is as follows:
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(1) at the beginning of each round, the price strategies are set simultaneously and marked on
the associated response sheet;
(2) subsequently, the choices of both ﬁrms are exchanged by means of pieces of paper provided
by the experimenter; and
(3) ﬁnally, compute your own proﬁt, given the strategy of the other ﬁrm.
Indicate for each month on your response sheet: (i) the strategy you prefer, (ii) the strategy of
the other ﬁrm and (iii) the proﬁt you gained. Except for the exchange of the pieces of paper after
each round, no communication is allowed during the experiment.
Game IV
Repeat game III for a known number of months (rounds). More precisely, you play the game
for twelve rounds (months).
Game V
In the following period of twelve months demand has increased substantially, associated with
an increasing proﬁt potential. This new situation is reﬂected in the following proﬁt combinations
(proﬁts are in thousands of Dutch Guilders, Dﬂ.).
Firm II
Low price High price
Low price (20, 20) (800, 400)
Firm I
High price (400, 800) (600, 600)
Proceed as in game IV.
Game setting Experiment II
The game setting in Experiment II is exactly the same except for slight diﬀerences in the payoﬀ
structure. For the ﬁrst four games the following proﬁt (loss) combinations were used: (20, 20),
(500, 500), (500, 500), (200, 200). In game V these combinations are: (10, 10), (700, 700),
(700, 700), (400, 400).
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